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Forced Return of Haitian Migrants Under Executive
Order 12,807: A Violation of Domestic and
International Law
Konstitisyon si papie, bayonet sift'
Introduction
Since the large-scale migration of Haitian refugees to the United
States began in the 1970s, the Haitian "boat people" have been in
the news and in the courtroom. It was not until former President
Bush's "Kennebunkport Order" of May 24, 1992,2 however, that the
plight of the Haitian people took center stage from a humanitarian,
legal, and international point of view. More specifically, the Second
Circuit's decision in Haitian Centers Council v. McNary3 set the stage
for a legal battle before the United States Supreme Court. In strik-
ing down the validity of an interdiction program that forcibly repa-
triates Haitian aliens without first determining their refugee status,
the Second Circuit relied on its interpretation of United States immi-
gration law4 and on the United States' obligations under the 1967
Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. 5
The full impact of both the "Kennebunkport Order" and the
decision in Haitian Centers Council cannot be fully appreciated without
a glimpse into Haitian history. Thus, Part I of this Note begins with
a description of the political upheaval in Haiti. Part II then describes
the United States' reaction to the Haitian migration. The Haitian
Centers Council case is discussed first in Part III, which sets out the
court's analysis, and then in Part IV, which examines the significance
of the decision. To complete this study of the plight of the Haitian
refugees, Part V then describes the general reaction to the Bush Ad-
ministration's actions. In conclusion, this Note contends that the de-
cision in Haitian Centers Council not only responds to a humanitarian
I Creole saying: "The Constitution is made of paper, bayonets are of steel."
2 Exec. Order No. 12,807, 57 Fed. Reg. 23,133 (1992) [hereinafter "Kennebunkport
Order"].
3 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992)
(HCC i/).
4 The statute at issue was section 243(h) of the Immigration and Nationality Act. 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (1992).
5 Oct. 4, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223, T.I.A.S. No. 6577 (entered into force with respect to
the United States on Nov. 1, 1968) [hereinafter Protocol].
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outcry for help, but also follows the Congressional mandate reflected
in section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act and hon-
ors the United States' non-refoulement obligation enunciated in the
1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees.
I. Plight of the Haitian People
In 1804, under a cry of "La Libert6 ou La Mort, ' '6 the Haitian
people defeated the French army to become the first black republic
in the world. Today, the Haitians cry out for "La D6mocratie ou La
Mort. '" 7 Nearly two centuries after gaining their independence, the
Haitian people continue to live under a government controlled by
the military and continue to suffer violent and massive human rights
violations.8 Under the regimes of Frangois ("Papa Doc") Duvalier
and his son Jean-Claude ("Baby Doc") Duvalier, 9 the Tonton
Macoutes, a secret militia created by Frangois Duvalier, terrorized
the countryside, and the Haitian people lived in fear of violence, tor-
ture, and exile.' 0
On February 7, 1986, it appeared that the Tonton Macoutes'
reign of terror was at an end when "Baby Doc" and his cronies fled
the country." In 1987, the Haitian Constitution was revised to
"guarantee... inalienable and indefeasible rights to life, liberty, and
the pursuit of happiness, in conformity with ... the Universal Decla-
ration of Human Rights of 1948."12 While protecting the Haitians'
freedom on paper, this constitution did nothing to prevent arbitrary
detentions without arrest procedures or due process, 13 to halt the
random beatings, robberies, and rapes,14 nor to protect the Haitians
from becoming the victims of senseless massacres.' 5 Moreover, de-
spite official reassurances from the National Council of Government
(the provisional Haitian government established after the overthrow
6 English translation: "Liberty or Death."
7 English translation: "Democracy or Death."
8 See generally LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS
NIGHTMARE (1992) [hereinafter HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE].
9 "Papa Doc" ruled Haiti from 1957 until his death in 1971. "Baby Doc" took over
after his father's death and ruled the country until February of 1986 when he was over-
thrown. See generally Immigration Reform: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Immigration, Refugees,
and International Law of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 701, 711-16
(1981) (prepared statement of Dr. Alexander Stepick, Sociology Department, Florida In-
ternational University) [hereinafter Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings].
10 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, REFUGEE REFOULEMENT: THE
FORCED RETURN OF HAITIANS UNDER THE U.S.-HAITIAN INTERDICTION AGREEMENT 4 (1990)
[hereinafter REFUGEE REFOULEMENT]; Stepick, Immigration Reform Hearings, supra note 9, at
712, 716, 722-23, 732-33 (describing the origins of the Tonton Macoutes and the terror
and lawlessness of the countryside).
11 .EFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
12 PATRICK BELLEGRADE-SMITH, HAITI: THE BREACHED CITADEL 136-38 (1990).
13 See AMNESTY INTERNATIONAL REPORT 1984: HAITI 164-67 (1984).
14 See REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 28-32.
15 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 28-32.
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of Duvalier) that Haitians returning from abroad would not be
harmed, these Haitians often were tortured or imprisoned.' 6 None
of the promises of the National Council of Government (NCG) could
be trusted. Although the NCG agreed that democratic elections
were to be held under the direction of the Provisional Electoral
Council (PEC), an independent branch of the government, the Hai-
tian people would not be granted the freedom to vote. 17 November
29, 1987, the date set for the 1987 elections, was marred by violence
and bloodshed and culminated in the death of at least thirty-four
people.' 8 Sham elections were finally organized by the NCG. Pro-
fessor Leslie Maginat, a "puppet" of the army was "selected" as
President. 19 His presidential authority, however, was ended on June
20, 1988, when the NCG resumed power over the country.20
During the reign of the army-dominated provisional govern-
ment, violence continued to erupt throughout the country and
culminated in the St. Jean Bosco tragedy in the summer of 1988.21
This mad assault left thirteen church parishioners dead and at least
seventy wounded. 22 A week after this massacre, a coup d'6tat
brought General Prosper Avril into power. 23
The Haitian people fared no better under President Avril's
reign. OnJanuary 20, 1990, President Avril declared a state of siege,
suspended four articles of the Haitian Constitution, and prohibited
the entry of visas for returning Haitians.24 These actions brought
serious international criticism from the United States, France, and
Canada and the siege was ultimately lifted on January 29, 1990.
The Haitian people dared to hope for an end to the prolonged
years of persecution and violence with the election ofJean Bertrand
Aristide. On December 16, 1990, 2.4 million people voted in elect-
ing Aristide.25 The first peaceful democratic election in the coun-
try's history actually took place. The Aristide government then
16 See LAWYERS COMMITTEE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN HA-
ri 45 (unpublished report to the Organization of American States) (Nov. 1980).
17 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
18 This violence is attributed to the army which controlled the CNG and which
wanted to keep its power, and to the former "Duvaliiristes" who had been prohibited
from holding any governmental positions by the Haitian Constitution of 1987. REFUGEE
REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 26. See also U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORT ON
HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR 1987, 510 (1988).
19 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
20 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 26.
21 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 27. The army attacked the St. Jean Bosco
Church where Father Jean-Bertrand Aristide was speaking.
22 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 27.
23 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 27.
24 Id. Events which led up to the declaration of a state of siege include the torture of
three well-known government opponents by the military, the massacre of an outspoken
radio talk show host by two armed civilians, and the murder of an officer in the Presidential
Guard. REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 27.
25 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 2.
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announced the retirement of military officials who were implicated in
past human rights violations, replaced corrupt government prosecu-
tors, and most importantly, dissolved the institution of rural section
chiefs which had, in the past, been at the heart of human rights
abuses in Haiti. 26 President Aristide's action, however, did not al-
ways conform with his promise to bring justice. 27 Finally, on Sep-
tember 27, 1991, Aristide gave a speech that arguably condoned the
use of P~re Lebrun 28 and other acts of vigilante justice.2 9 The mili-
tary seized this opportunity to denounce Aristide and his betrayal of
human rights and took steps to take over the government.30 On Sep-
tember 30, 1991, a bloody coup forced President Aristide to leave
the country.3' The military-controlled government then freed pris-
oners accused of violating human rights and reinstated the old sec-
tion chief structures.3 2 Haiti once more was cloaked with fear,
instability, and violence. 3s
International reaction was quick to occur as the Organization of
American States (OAS), lead by the United States, imposed an em-
bargo on Haiti in October of 1991.3 4 The goal of this embargo was
to force the army-controlled government to reinstate President Aris-
tide.3 5 To date, the OAS embargo has not forced the current Hai-
tian government to yield its power, and to date, it is this military-
controlled government, one not recognized by the United States,
that the Haitian people are attempting to flee when they brave 600
miles of shark infested waters in rickety boats in hopes of reaching a
haven: the United States.
II. United States' Reaction to theHaitian Migration
A. The Reagan Administration
The 1970s marked the beginning of the Haitian migration to the
26 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 3.
27 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 4. President Aristide failed
to condemn public mob violence and some of his speeches inflamed public sentiment and
were seen as encouraging vigilante groups.
28 P~re Lebrun consists of placing a tire around a victim's neck and shoulders and
then setting it ablaze. HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 4.
29 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 6.
SO HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 6-7.
31 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 1.
32 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 7.
33 See HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 9-62 (citing examples of
extrajudicial executions, arbitrary arrests and illegal detentions, repression of the right of
free expression, repressions of freedom of assembly and association, torture and mistreat-
ment of detainees and prisoners, military interference in the judicial process, and failures
to investigate and prosecute human rights violations).
34 Haiti.- Update on Recent Political Developments'and Violence, NOTISUR-SOUTH AMERI-
CAN AND CARIBBEAN POLITICAL AFFAIRS, Sept. 15, 1992 [hereinafter UPDATE].
35 Id. (noting that the trade embargo on Haiti "has not been very firm" and describ-
ing that negotiations between Aristide and the current Haitian Prime Minister, Marc Bazin,
have been more like extended conversations rather than negotiations).
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United States.36 By 1978, between six and seven thousand Haitian
asylum cases were pending in the Miami office 37 and by the begin-
ning of 1981, an estimated thirty-five thousand undocumented Hai-
tians were living in South Florida. 38
Even though Haitians constituted less than two percent of the
illegal immigrants to the United States,3 9 on September 29, 1981,
the Reagan Administration announced the creation of its interdiction
program.40 Having determined that the ongoing migration to the
United States had become "a serious national problem detrimental
to the interests of [our country]," 4 1 President Reagan authorized the
Secretary of State to enter into "cooperative arrangements with ap-
propriate foreign governments for the purpose of preventing illegal
migration to the United States" 42 and ordered the United States
Coast Guard to intercept vessels 43 on the high seas and to "return
the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came
....- Finally, and most importantly, while seeking to curb illegal
migration to the United States, the Reagan Administration recog-
nized and honored the "strict observance of our international obliga-
tions concerning those who genuinely flee persecution in their
homeland" 45 and provided that "no person who is a refugee will be
returned without his consent."'46
36 Jean v. Nelson, 711 F.2d 1455, 1464 (11 th Cir. 1983), rev'd in part, 727 F.2d 957
(11 th Cir. 1984) (en banc), aff'd 472 U.S. 846 (1985).
37 Haitian Refugee Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023, 1029 (5th Cir. 1982). Due to the
uncertainty as to asylum procedures applicable to excludable aliens, the immigration law
judges were reluctant to hold these hearings. A backlog developed and the INS imple-
mented an accelerated program to process Haitian asylum cases. Prior to the program,
between one and ten hearings were held per day; after the implementation of the program,
there were as many as eighty deportation hearings per day. Id. at 1029-31.
Under this INS program, the few attorneys and volunteers that were available to help
the Haitian people did not have adequate time to prepare the cases. Id. at 1031. Inade-
quate legal representation combined with incomplete asylum applications and poor trans-
lation culminated in a program which "in its planning and executing [was] offensive to
every notion of constitutional due process and equal protection." Haitian Refugee Center
v. Civiletti, 503 F. Supp. 442, 532 (S.D. Fla. 1980), modified sub. nom., Haitian Refugee
Center v. Smith, 676 F.2d 1023 (5th Cir. 1982).
38 Nelson, 711 F.2d at 1464.
39 Coast Guard Oversight-Part 2: Hearings on Military Readiness and International Pro-
grams Before the Subcomm. on Coast Guard and Navigation of the House Comm. on theJudiciary, 97th
Cong., 1st Sess. 13-16 (1981).
40 Exec. Order No. 12,324, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,109 (1981) [hereinafter Reagan Exec.
Order]; Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981).
41 Proclamation No. 4865, 46 Fed. Reg. 48,107 (1981).
42 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, § 1.
43 The term vessel included "vessels without nationality, vessels assimilated to vessels
without nationality in accordance with paragraph (2) of Article 6 of the Convention on the
High Seas of 1958 .. .and vessels of foreign nations with whom [the United States] has
arrangements authorizing the stop[ping] and board[ing] of such vessels." Reagan Exec.
Order, supra note 40, §§ 2, 3.
44 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, § 2(c)(3).
45 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, § 3.
46 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, § 2(c)(3).
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Along with the creation of this interdiction program, the United
States entered into an agreement with Haiti on September 23,
1981. 47 By way of exchange of notes, the two governments agreed
to "stop the clandestine migration of numerous residents of Haiti to
the United States." 48 The Haitian government consented to the de-
tention on the high seas of Haitian flagged vessels, authorized the
Coast Guard to determine the status of those persons on board, and
agreed to the "selective return to Haiti of certain Haitian migrants
and vessels involved in illegal transport of persons coming from Ha-
iti."'4 0 The United States also agreed to the presence of a represen-
tative of the Haitian Navy to act as a liaison aboard any United States
vessel involved in the interdiction of Haitian vessels. 50 Most signifi-
cantly, this agreement recognized the "international obligations
mandated in the Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees done in
New York 31 January 1967,"'5 and explicitly provided that "the
United States Government does not intend to return to Haiti any
Haitian migrants whom the United States authorities determine to
qualify for refugee status."5 2 Finally, the Haitian Government as-
sured that it would not prosecute "Haitians returned to their country
and who are not traffickers." '5 3
In the implementation of this interdiction program, the Immi-
gration and Naturalization Service (INS) issued guidelines setting
forth the procedures the Coast Guard was to follow during the in-
terdiction and repatriation of the Haitian people. 54 According to
these guidelines, the Coast Guard must ensure that "the United
States is in compliance with its obligations regarding actions towards
47 Agreement Establishing Interdiction and Selective Return of Haitian Migrants and
Vessels, Sept. 23, 1981, U.S.-Haiti, 33 U.S.T. 3359, 3359 [hereinafter U.S.-Haiti Agree-
ment]. At the time of this agreement, Jean-Claude Duvalier was ruling the country. It
should be noted that Haiti is the only country with which the United States has such an
interdiction agreement.
48 Id.
49 Id. at 3559-3561.
50 Id. at 3560.
51 Id. at 3559. The United States Department of State repeatedly emphasized that
those who have a well-founded fear of persecution would not be returned to Haiti. Robert
Gellbard, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs, U.S. Response to Recent
Haitian Exodus (Nov. 18, 1991), in DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH, Nov. 25, 1991 [hereinafter
Gellbard Dispatch]. However, the screening process utilized may not be adequate to de-
termine refugee status. Although the State Department stated that "there is no history of
[the repatriated Haitians] being persecuted," there is documented evidence to the con-
trary. See REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 33-48 (describing specific cases of Hai-
tians who were "screened out" by the Coast Guard and denied the opportunity to claim
asylum but who in fact were fearful of political persecution and would thus qualify as
refugees).
52 U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 47, at 3560.
53 U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 47, at 3560.
54 Haitian Refugee Center, Inc. v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1501-02 (11th Cir.) (per
curiam), cert denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992) (citing INS, INS ROLE AND GUIDELINES FOR
INTERDICTION AT SEA (guidelines issued under an unpublished directive dated Oct. 6,
1981, amended Mar. 1, 1988) [hereinafter INS GUIDELINES]).
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refugees, including the necessity of being keenly attuned during any
interdiction program to any evidence which may reflect an individ-
ual's well-founded fear of persecution by his or her country of origin
for reasons of race, religion, nationality, or membership within a par-
ticular social group or political opinion."'55 If this initial screening
by the Coast Guard indicates that a Haitian may qualify for refugee
status, a second interview is required.56 Although this second inter-
view is to be conducted out of the hearing of other persons, little
other guidance is provided for the INS officials. 57 Under this kind of
minimal screening, only six Haitians have been allowed to come to
the United States to present asylum claims.58 Between 1981 and
1990, 21,455 interdicted Haitians were repatriated to Haiti.59
B. The Bush Administration
Following the overthrow of Aristide, the Bush Administration
temporarily halted the interdiction program. This repatriation pro-
gram, however, was reinstated on November 18, 1991, when the Ad-
ministration sought to deter Haitians from risking their lives by
"taking to the sea in unseaworthy boats." 60 Since then, thousands
upon thousands of Haitians have been interdicted. 6 1 In order to
deal with this large-scale migration, the United States used its base at
Guantanamo, Cuba as a human sanctuary. 62 Following the directives
of the Reagan Executive Order,63 the Haitians at the base were inter-
viewed in order to identify those with credible claims for asylum.64
Haitians with such credible claims were "screened in" and were to be
brought to the United States so that they could file an application
55 Id. at 1501.
56 Id. at 1502. Although the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees ob-
served these interviews and recommended that the INS officers interview each Haitian
privately in a place where he can express himself freely and cannot be overheard, this
recommendation has not been heeded. The few brief questions asked by the Coast Guard
may not be sufficient to determine whether a Haitian qualifies for refugee status. See REFU-
GEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 20-25.
57 Baker, 953 F.2d at 1502.
58 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 23. Of those six Haitians, two had lived
in the United States and were therefore somewhat familiar with the American legal pro-
cess, and three were educated teachers who were able to articulate their claims. Id.
59 REFUGEE REFOULEMENT, supra note 10, at 23.
60 Gellbard Dispatch, supra note 51. See atso Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary,
969 F.2d 1326, 1330 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC
I).
61 See James Vicini, High Court to Rule On Forced Return of Haitian Immigrants, Reuters,
Ltd., Oct. 5, 1992.
62 Brunson McKinley, Deputy Assistant Secretary for Refugee Programs, U.S. Policy
on Haitian Refugees, Statement Before the Subcomms. on Western Hemisphere Affairs
and on International Operations of the House Foreign Affairs Comm. (June 11, 1992), in
DEP'T. ST. DISPATCH, June 15, 1992 [hereinafter McKinley Statement].
63 See supra notes 40-46 and accompanying text.
64 McKinley Statement, supra note 62.
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under the Immigration and Nationality Act.6 5 Those Haitians who
did not satisfy the threshold standard for refugee status were
"screened out" and were to be repatriated to Haiti.66
On May 24, 1992, President Bush noted that "there continues to
be a serious problem of persons attempting to come to the United
States by sea without necessary documentation and otherwise ille-
gally." 6 7 The Bush Administration's solution was to implement the
"Kennebunkport Order." 68 This executive order effectively re-
voked the interdiction program of the Reagan Administration, 69 and
replaced it with new interdiction and repatriation directives.
Although both the Reagan Interdiction Program and President
Bush's "Kennebunkport Order" share the same objective of control-
ling the influx of Haitian migration, the programs are radically differ-
ent in their treatment of refugees. While the Reagan Administration
sought to abide by its international obligations to seek out and pro-
tect political refugees, the Bush Administration declared that "the
international obligations of the United States under the United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees to apply Article 33
of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees
do not extend to persons located outside the territory of the United
States."170 Therefore, this order is not to be construed to "require
any procedures to determine whether a person is a refugee,"'7 ' and
illegal Haitian migrants intercepted on the high seas are to be repa-
triated to Haiti without any kind of screening or interviewing pro-
cess, regardless of the fact that they may be political refugees. The
Bush Administration defended this order by stating that an essential
element of this policy is to safeguard human life72 and by engaging
in the presumption that "most of the [Haitian] people are seeking
better economic opportunity" 73 and hence do not qualify for polit-
ical asylum.74 During the first seven months of 1992, the United Na-
tions High Commissioner for Refugees reported that the U.S. Coast
Guard intercepted 38,315 Haitians. 75
65 See Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541, 542 (E.D.N.Y.),
aff'd as modified, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992) cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1992) (HCC 1).
66 Id.
67 Kennebunkport Order, supra note 2 at Intro. § 4.
68 See Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct 5, 1992) (HCC I1).
69 Kennebunkport Order, supra note 2, § 4.
70 Kennebunkport Order, supra note 2, § 3.
71 Kennebunkport Order, supra note 2, § 3.
72 McKinley Statement, supra note 62.
73 McKinley Statement, supra note 62.
74 International obligations relating to refugees protect only "political" and not
"economic" refugees. See infra notes 89, 116-18 and accompanying text.
75 UPDATE, supra note 34.
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III. Challenge to the Legality of President Bush's Interdiction
Program
A. Facts and Background
Prior to the institution of President Bush's Executive Order,
Haitian Centers Council 76 challenged the procedures of the 1981 In-
terdiction Program 7 7 instituted by Ronald Reagan. The plaintiffs
sought a preliminary injunction to restrain the defendants 7 8 from:
(1) denying the plaintiff Haitian Service Organizations access to
their clients for the purpose of providing the Haitians with legal
counsel, advocacy, and representation; (2) interviewing, screening,
or subjecting to exclusion or asylum proceedings any Haitian citizen
being held at Guantanamo Bay, on U.S. Coast Guard Cutters, or on
territory subject to United States jurisdiction, who was "screened
out" without advice of counsel; and (3) returning to Haiti any Hai-
tian citizen who was "screened out" without the benefit of advice of
counsel. 79 In addition, the plaintiffs challenged the actions under
the interdiction program claiming violations of United States immi-
gration statutes, the first and fifth amendments of the United States
Constitution, and the Administrative Procedure Act. 80 The prelimi-
nary injunction was granted by the district court8 ' and was stayed by
the Supreme Court pending disposition of the appeal by the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. 8 2 On appeal, the
Second Circuit affirmed the issuance of the preliminary injunction
76 Haitian Centers Council, Inc. v. McNary, 789 F. Supp. 541 (E.D.N.Y.), aff'das modi-
fied, 969 F.2d 1326 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC
1). The plaintiffs in the case included: Haitian Centers Council, Inc., National Coalition
for Haitian Refugees, Inc., Immigration Law Clinic of the Jerome N. Frank Legal Services
Organization (the "Haitian Service Organization"); individual Haitians who were
"screened in"; individual Haitians who were "screened out"; and the "immediate rela-
tives" of these Haitians. Id.
77 Initially, Guantanamo Bay was used as a humanitarian sanctuary to accommodate
the thousands of Haitians interdicted at sea. Once at the Base, the "screened in" Haitians
were to be transported to the United States so they could process their claims for asylum.
However, on February 29, 1992, Grover Joseph Reeves, General Counsel of the INS, cir-
culated a memorandum authorizing "de facto" asylum proceedings at Guantanamo Bay.
While these proceedings were to be "identical in form and substance" to the ones con-
ducted in the United States, the Haitians were not able to receive legal advice during such
proceedings. Id. at 1345.
78 The defendants consisted of: Gene McNary, Commissioner of the Immigration
and Naturalization Services; William P. Barr, Attorney General; Immigration and Naturali-
zation Service; James Baker III, Secretary of State; Rear Admiral Robert Kramek and Ad-
miral Kime, Commandants, United States Coast Guard; and Commander, U.S. Naval Base,
Guantanamo Bay. HCC 1, 789 F. Supp. 541.
79 Id. at 542.
80 HCC 1, 969 F.2d at 1332. The district court determined that collateral estoppel did
not bar this present action and found that there were serious questions going to the merits
with regards to the first and fifth amendment claims, but found no statutory relief under
the INA. HCC 1, 789 F. Supp. at 546-47.
81 HCC 1, 789 F. Supp. at 548.
82 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 112 S. Ct. 1714 (1992) (HCC 1).
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granted by the district court.83 The appeals court refused to apply
the doctrine of collateral estoppel 4 and agreed that the "screened
in" Haitians could avail themselves to the protections afforded by the
fifth amendment.8 5 This decision, however, was in effect rendered
moot by President Bush's "Kennebunkport Order."
B. The Second Round
On May 28, 1992, four days after President Bush's Executive
Order directing the Coast Guard to intercept boatloads of Haitian
refugees on the high seas and to repatriate them forcibly, a class ac-
tion was brought on behalf of all refugees who possessed credible
fears of persecution upon their return to Haiti or who were repatri-
ated under this Order.8 6 The plaintiffs8 7 challenged the govern-
ment's actions under this new interdiction program as violative of:
(1) section 243(h)(1) of the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA);88 (2) Article 33 of the 1951 Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees;89 (3) the 1981 U.S.-Haiti Executive Agreement;90
(4) the Administrative Procedure Act;9 l and (5) the equal protec-
tion component of the fifth amendment's due process clause.92 This
class sought a temporary restraining order to prevent the defend-
ants93 from repatriating, under this Order, any interdicted Haitian
whose life or freedom would be threatened on account of his race,
religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or
83 The Second Circuit modified the injunction by vacating that portion which re-
quired defendants to allow the "screened in" plaintiffs to have access to attorneys at Guan-
tanamo Bay, but upholding the portion that prevented defendants from processing or
repatriating "screened in" Haitians at Guantanamo Bay without providing them access to
legal counsel. HCC 1, 969 F.2d at 1347.
84 The defendants argued that this action was barred by the Eleventh Circuit's previ-
ous decision in Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker. The Second Circuit determined that the
class defined in the Florida action was "overly broad" and that the issues presented in this
case were not actually litigated. Id. at 1337.
85 Id. at 1345.
86 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8452 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd,
969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II).
87 The plaintiffs are the same as found in HCC I. See supra note 76.
88 Section 243(h)(1) of the INA now reads: "The Attorney General shall not deport
or return any alien . . . to a country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's
life or freedom would be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion." 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)
(Supp. 1992).
89 United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, 189 U.N.T.S. 137
(1954) [hereinafter United Nations Convention]. Article 33.1 prohibits the " . . . return
(refouler) [of] a refugee in any manner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his
life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group, or political opinion." Id.
90 See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
91 The APA provides a source ofjudicially enforceable rights. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 501-
701 (1988).
92 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1353 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC 11).




The district court construed the plaintiffs' motion as an applica-
tion for a preliminary injunction and denied the injunction. 95 While
stating its astonishment at a government interdiction program that
"return[s] Haitian refugees to the jaws of political persecution, ter-
ror, death, and uncertainty" 96 the court found section 243(h) of the
INA inapplicable to Haitian aliens interdicted on high seas. The dis-
trict court also concluded that, notwithstanding the explicit
mandatory language of Article 33, the Protocol was not self-execut-
ing and did not afford the Haitian refugees protection. 97
The plaintiffs appealed this decision to the Second Circuit, again
arguing that the current interdiction program violated section 243(h)
of the INA, Article 33 of the Refugee Convention, the 1981 U.S.-
Haiti Agreement, the Administrative Procedure Act, and the fifth
amendment's equal protection component. 98 The defendants rebut-
ted these claims and further asserted that (1) this action was barred
by collateral estoppel and (2) that the Executive Order was within
the President's constitutional powers as commander-in-chief and his
inherent authority over foreign relations, and was issued under au-
thorization from Congress. 99
C. Striking Down President Bush's Executive Order
On July 29, 1992, the Second Circuit reversed the district
court's denial of a preliminary injunction in a 2-1 decision. 10 0 En-
gaging in de novo review,' 0 ' the court first addressed the govern-
ment's contention that the plaintiffs were barred from litigating this
case due to the Eleventh Circuit's recent decision in Haitian Refugee
Center v. Baker.'0 2 In rejecting the government's collateral estoppel
argument, the court held that neither those plaintiffs who would be
94 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 1992 U.S. Dist. Lexis 8452, 02 (E.D.N.Y.
1992), rev'd, 969 F.2d 1350 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3256 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1992) (HCC 11).
95 In order to succeed on a motion for a preliminary injunction, the moving party
must demonstrate: (1) irreparable harm should the injunction be denied, and (2) either a
likelihood of success on the merits or sufficiently serious questions going to the merits and
a balance of hardships tipping decidedly toward the party seeking injunctive relief. Id. at
*4. The district court determined that although the plaintiffs made a substantial showing
of irreparable harm, they were unlikely to succeed on the merits. Id.
96 Id. at *5.
97 Id. at *4-5. The other issues raised by the plaintiffs were not addressed.
98 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1354 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II).
99 Id.
100 Id. at 1368.
101 Defendants did not challenge the district court's finding that the plaintiffs made a
substantial showing of irreparable harm, the only issue being the district court's construc-
tion of the law. Since only questions of law were raised on appeal, de novo review is to be
applied. Id. at 1354.
102 953 F.2d 1498 (1 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
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screened in, nor those plaintiffs who would be screened out, but who
are being intercepted under the new interdiction program, represent
the same class of plaintiffs represented in the Baker litigation. 0 3 Fur-
thermore, regarding the plaintiffs that were arguably members of the
Baker class, the court found the Executive Order to represent an in-
tervening change in circumstance that warrants a new
determination. 104
The court then proceeded to address the merits of the plaintiff.'s
claim under section 243(h) of the INA. 10 5 Noting the 1980 amend-
ments to section 243(h), the court placed particular emphasis on the
plain language of section 243(h)(1) which now reads:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien ... to a
country if the Attorney General determines that such alien's life or
freedom would be threatened in such country on account that such
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such country on ac-
count of race, religion, nationality, membership in a particular social
group, or political opinion.,o 6
The court pointed out that the amendments served to strip the At-
torney General of his discretionary power, to make the statute apply
to"any alien" rather than to "any alien in the United States", and to
forbid the Attorney General to "deport or return any alien" rather
than to "withhold deportation of any alien."' 0 7 Thus, concluded the
court, if the plaintiffs in this case fit within the definition of "any
alien," and if the interdiction and repatriation of the Haitians on the
high seas amounts to a "return" under the statute, then the Bush
Executive Order violates U.S. law.
In determining the meaning of "any alien", the court noted that
section 101(a)(3) of the INA t08 makes it plain that aliens are aliens
regardless of where they are located.' 0 9 The government's conten-
tion that U.S. laws should not be applied extraterritorially was inap-
plicable in this context because Congress explicitly addressed this
issue and purposely made the statute applicable to "any alien."
Moreover, it was unimportant that section 243(h)(2) specifically ap-
plied to an alien within the United States.i l ° Section 243(h) distin-
guished between two groups of aliens: those within the United
103 HCC H1, 969 F.2d at 1355.
104 Id. at 1356.
105 The only issue decided by this court on appeal is whether section 243(h) of the
INA applies outside of the United States territorial waters. The court did not address the
other claims.
106 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h) (Supp. 1992).
107 Compare 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (Supp. 1992) with 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C)
(1977).
108 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(3) (1992). An alien is defined as "any person not a citizen or
national of the United States." Id.
109 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1358 (2d Cir. 1992), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II).
IlO Id. at 1359.
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States and all others. Subsection (2) of this statute reflected Con-
gress' intent to preserve this distinction for the limited purpose of
the "serious nonpolitical crime" exception."' It was also unimpor-
tant that section 243(h) was located in Part V of the INA dealing
primarily with deportation and adjustment of status because this re-
flects the original placement of the statute prior to the amendments
when section 243(h) applied only to deportation." 12
The Second Circuit proceeded to conclude that the word "re-
turn" prohibits the government from intercepting and forcibly repa-
triating Haitians on the high seas. 1 3 Since the INA does not define
the word "return," it should be given its plain meaning: "to bring,
send, or put (a person or thing) back to or in a former position."' 114
The court placed particular emphasis on the fact that Congress did
not mention where the alien must be returned "from"; 115 rather, the
emphasis was on the place the alien was to be returned "to." ' "16
Article 33 of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Sta-
tus of Refugees provided further support for this conclusion. Article
33.1 prohibits the " . . . return (refouler) [of] a refugee in any man-
ner whatsoever to the frontiers of territories where his life or free-
dom would be threatened on account of his race, religion,
nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion."1 7 This non-refoulement obligation also emphasizes the
place the refugee is to be returned "to." ' 18 Furthermore, the defini-
tion of a "refugee" supports this conclusion. Having defined a "ref-
ugee" as "any person who owing to a well-founded fear of being
persecuted ... is outside the country of his nationality . . .",119 this
provision is similar to the INA's definition of "any alien." The focus
is not on a person's current location, but rather on his past loca-
tion. 120 Based on its interpretation of section 243(h), the Second
Circuit found that the plain language of section 243(h)(1) of the INA
"clearly prohibits the United States from returning aliens to their
persecutors, no matter where in the world those actions are
I 1I Section 243(h)(2)(C) directs that the provisions of 243(h)(1) are inapplicable when
"there are serious reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolit-
ical crime outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States." 8
U.S.C. § 1253(h)(2)(C) (Supp. 1992).
112 HCC 11, 969 F.2d at 1359-60.
113 Id. at 1360-67.
114 Id. at 1360.
115 Id. at 1360-61.
116 Id. at 1361.
117 Id. at 1361 (quoting from the United Nations Convention, supra note 89).
Although the United States is not a party to the United Nations Convention, it is a signa-
tory of the United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The Protocol
incorporates Articles 2 through 34 of the Convention. See Protocol, supra note 5.
118 HCC 11, 969 F.2d at 1362-63.
119 Id. at 1362 (quoting from the Protocol, supra note 5, 19 U.S.T. at 6225).
120 Id.
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taken."121
IV. Significance of the Case
The Second Circuit's interpretation of section 243(h) of the INA
has obvious significance to the thousands of Haitian refugees who
are being forcibly repatriated to a country where they continue to
face persecution. Despite the government's contention that the Hai-
tians are fleeing "economic" conditions, reports of abuse, torture,
and massacres continue to pour into the United States.' 22 While this
humanitarian component is arguably the most important aspect of
the Second Circuit's ruling, this decision also presents two legally
significant issues to the Supreme Court. As a matter of statutory in-
terpretation, the 'Supreme Court must resolve whether section
243(h) of the INA applies extraterritorially to protect would-be refu-
gees interdicted on the high seas. Secondly, this case may test the
Court's view regarding the extent to which lower courts can review
Presidential orders in the area of foreign policy.
A. Statutory Interpretation of Section 243(h): Resolving a Circuit
Split
While the Second Circuit maintains that section 243(h) applies
extraterritorially to protect Haitian refugees interdicted on the high
seas,' 23 the Eleventh Circuit contends that this statute protects only
aliens who have reached United States territory.' 2 4 It is the Second
Circuit's interpretation in Haitian Centers Council, however, that is
consistent with congressional intent and with the international obli-
gations of the United States.
The 1980 amendments to section 243(h) of the INA reflect Con-
gress' desire to effectuate a change in United States immigration law,
and more importantly reflect a desire to conform to the United
States' obligations under the United Nations Protocol Relating to the
Status of Refugees. Before 1980, section 243(h) of the INA read as
follows:
The Attorney General is authorized to withhold deportation of any
alien within the United States to any country in which in his opinion the
alien would be subject to persecution on account of race, religion, or
121 Id. at 1367.
122 See UPDATE, supra note 34 (stating that since the coup, the armed forces and police
have murdered approximately 3,000 Haitians, arbitrarily detained 4,000, wounded or
beaten 2,000, and conducted more than 1,800 warrantless searches); Haiti Police Seize 150
Forced Home, TORONTO STAR, Aug. 14, 1992, at AI (Haitians forcibly repatriated under the
Bush Interdiction Program were detained and taken for "questioning" by the Haitian po-
lice); HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8 (describing the continued state of
violence in Haiti since the overthrow of President Aristide in 1991).
123 HCC H1, 969 F.2d at 1357-67.
124 Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1509-10 (11th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
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political opinion and for such period of time he deems to be neces-
sary for such reason.
After the 1980 amendments, section 243(h)(1) reads:
The Attorney General shall not deport or return any alien (other than
an alien described in § 1251(a)(4)(D) of this title) to a country if the
Attorney General determines that such alien's life or freedom would
be threatened in such country on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion. 125
The statutory interpretation given to these amendments must reflect
and give effect to Congress' apparent goals.
Of particular importance to this case are the amendments that
prohibit the "return"' 12 6 of "any alien." The meaning of the term
"alien" is easily determined because Congress has defined it explic-
itly to refer to "any person not a citizen or national of the United
States,' 1 7 regardless of location.' 2 8 The dissent in Haitian Centers
Council offers two arguments against such an interpretation. 29 First,
the dissent notes that the term "any alien" was used in the statute
prior to the 1980 amendments and that at that time, there was no
question of its extraterritorial application.' 30 The dissent fails to
note, however, that prior to 1980 the statute specifically applied to
"any alien within the United States."' 3 ' It was under Congress' use of
an express geographical limitation that the courts construed the stat-
ute to apply only to aliens within United States territory. Such previ-
ous interpretations do not lend support to the conclusion that the
definition of the term "alien" in and of itself depends upon location.
On the contrary, the use of an explicit geographical limitation next
to the word "alien" indicates legislative intent that the term "alien,"
if used without any limitations, extends to people inside and outside
the United States.
Even the Baker court implicitly accepts this view. Though con-
cluding that section 243(h) applied only to "aliens within the United
States," the Eleventh Circuit stated that the amendments did not
125 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1) (Supp. 1992) (emphasis added).
126 It should be noted that HCC I and Baker are the first cases to address the meaning
of the world "return." Previous case law addressed the deportability aspect of the statute.
127 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(3) (Supp. 1992).
128 Since the plain language of the statute answers the question, the court looks to
other canons of construction only to determine whether there is a "clearly expressed legis-
lative intention" contrary to that language, which would require [the court] to question the
strong presumption that Congress expresses its intent through the language it chooses.
Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1358 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting United
States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 606 (1986)), cert. granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5,
1992) (HCC II).
129 While the Government put forth several arguments against an all-encompassing
definition of an alien and while these arguments were addressed and rejected by Judge
Pratt, the dissent did not criticize the decision reached by Judge Pratt on those issues. For
Judge Pratt's analysis of the Government's arguments see HCC 11, 969 F.2d at 1357-1360.
1so HCC II, 969 F.2d at 1374 (Walker, J., dissenting).
131 See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
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manifest an intent to include "aliens beyond the borders of the
United States."' 132 In essence, by specifically differentiating between
two groups of "aliens" and by never rejecting the use of the term
"alien" to describe the interdicted Haitians, the Baker court acknowl-
edged the extraterritorial scope of the definition.
The dissent in Haitian Centers Council is also troubled by the fact
that the word "alien" can have a different meaning depending on
whether it is modified by the word "deport" or by the word "re-
turn."' 33 However, since the term "deport" by its very nature im-
plies an alien within a port of the United States,' 34 any limitations on
the term "any alien" come from the verb "deport." An all-encom-
passing definition of the term "alien" is not to be altered by the fact
that section 243(h) is located in Part V (dealing with deportation and
adjustment of status) of the INA or by the wording of the serious
nonpolitical crime exception of section 243(h)(2)(C).
In Baker, the Eleventh Circuit relied almost exclusively on the
placement of section 243(h) in Part V of the INA to conclude that it
did not apply to the Haitian aliens. 135 This emphasis is flawed, how-
ever, because the Supreme Court has recognized that "where Con-
gress includes particular language in one section of a statute but
omits it in another section of the same Act, it is generally presumed
that Congress acts intentionally and purposely in the disparate inclu-
sion or exclusion."' 36 The statute's location in Part V of the INA
reflects the statute's placement prior to the 1980 amendments when,
indeed, section 243(h) was limited to deportable aliens.' 3 7 The Sec-
ond Circuit also points out that it is irrelevant that section
243(h)(2)(C) 138 applies only to aliens who have reached United
States territory.' 3 9 If this section is read to limit section 243(h)(1)
only to aliens within the United States, then the court would be re-
132 Haitian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1509-10 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied,
112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
133 HCC H1, 969 F.2d at 1374 (Walker, J., dissenting). Deportation proceedings can
only take place if an alien is within the United States.
134 Id. at 1359. Judge Pratt further notes that U.S. immigration laws make it plain that
any alien .. . in the United States" may be deported if certain conditions are met. See
generally 8 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (Supp. 1992).
135 Baker, 953 F.2d at 1510.
136 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 432 (1986) (quoting Russello v. United
States, 464 U.S. 16, 23 (1983), in turn quoting United States v. Wong Kim, 472 F.2d 720,
722 (5th Cir. 1972)).
137 HCC 11, 969 F.2d at 1360. Moreover, given that other portions of Part V are lim-
ited to aliens "in" or "within" the United States, this indicates Congress' ability to restrict
the statute's application to aliens within United States territory when it so chooses.
138 This section provides that section 243(h)(1) shall not apply where "there are seri-
ous reasons for considering that the alien has committed a serious nonpolitical crime
outside the United States prior to the arrival of the alien in the United States." 8 U.S.C.
§ 1253(h)(2)(C) (Supp. 1992).
139 HCC H, 969 F.2d at 1359.
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writing the statute to include what Congress expressly deleted. 140
"The canon of statutory construction requir[es] a change in lan-
guage to be read, if possible, to have some effect."' 14 1
Having determined that Congress intended to define the term
"alien" without regard to geographic limitation, the next critical
amendment to consider is Congress' insertion of the word "return."
Although the INA does not provide a definition of this term, the Sec-
ond Circuit correctly concluded that Congress has prohibited ex-
pressly the Government from interdicting and forcibly returning
Haitian refugees to Haiti.
"With regard to ... statutory schemes, [the courts] have consid-
ered [themselves] bound to 'assume that the legislative purpose is
expressed by the ordinary meaning of the words used.' "142 As pre-
viously discussed, the definition of the word is: "to bring, send, or
put (a person or thing) back to or in a former position."' 43 This
definition places emphasis on the condition a person is returned
"to." Similarly, in section 243(h), Congress forbade an alien from
being returned to a country where he would face persecution.' 44
Moreover, President Bush's Executive Order also stresses the place
an alien is to be returned to and directs the Coast Guard to "return
the vessel and its passengers to the country from which it came
"145
The dissent in Haitian Centers Council reasons that while Congress
did expand the scope of section 243(h), it meant to extend protec-
tion to excludable aliens. 146 Not only does this construction ignore
the fact that Congress knew how to make statutes apply to excludable
aliens, 147 but it also ignores the United States' international non-
refoulement obligation. 148
The United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees
is part of the Supreme Law of the Land, 149 and it affects the munici-
pal law of the United States both because it is self-executing' 5 0 and
140 Id.
141 American Nat'l Red Cross v. S.G., 112 S. Ct. 2465, 2471 (1992).
142 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421,431 (1986) (quoting INS v. Phinpathya, 464
U.S. 183, 189 (1984)).
143 WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1941 (1976).
144 HCC II, 969 F.2d at 1360.
145 Kennebunkport Order, supra note 2 at § 2(3) (emphasis added). It should be
noted that "the government does not offer a contrary view of the term 'return.' " HCC II,
969 F.2d at 1361.
146 HCC 11, 969 F.2d at 1375-76 (Walker, J., dissenting). Excludable aliens, like de-
portable aliens, must be within the United States to be classified as such. Id.
147 See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1362 (1988) (section applies to "the person concerned" in "any
exclusion or deportation proceeding") (emphasis added).
148 See Protocol, supra note 5.
149 See U.S. CONST. art. IV (making treaties of the United States supreme law of the
land); United States v. Postal, 589 F.2d 862, 875 (5th Cir. 1979) (analysis of treaties' status
as supreme law).
150 Although the Baker court recently held that the Protocol is not self-executing, Hai-
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because it has been given effect by the congressional enactment of
the Refugee Act.15 "If one thing is clear from the legislative history
of the . . . 1980 [Refugee] Act, it is that one of Congress' primary
purposes was to bring United States refugee law into conformance
with the 1967 United Nations Protocol Relating to the Status of Ref-
ugees .. .to which the United States acceded in 1968."152
To mirror the Protocol's definition of a refugee, Congress
drafted section 101(a)(42)(A) of the INA to provide that the term
"refugee" includes:
any person who is outside any country of such person's nationality
or, in the case of a person having no nationality, is outside any coun-
try in which such person last habitually resided, and who is unable or
unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling to avail himself or
herself of the protection of that country because of persecution
153
The Protocol's definition of the word "refugee" explicitly rejected
the temporal and geographic limitations imposed by the United Na-
tions Convention's definition 54 and reflects, in part, the drafters' in-
tent to apply the word "refugee" expansively.
The most fundamental right protected by both the United Na-
tions Convention and the Protocol is the refugee's right not to be
returned to a country where he or she faces persecution. This non-
refoulement obligation is set forth in Article 33.1 of the Convention
which provides:
No contracting State shall expel or return (refouler) a refugee in any
manner whatsoever to the frontiers or territories where his life or
freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, national-
ity, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. 155
tian Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1498, 1504 (11 th Cir.), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1245 (1992), there are cases to the contrary. See, e.g., Nicosia v. Wall, 442 F.2d 1005, 1006
n.4 (5th Cir. 1971) (stating, without recognizing implementing legislation, that "Protocol
binds acceding States to apply certain provisions of the 1951 Refugee Convention"); Fer-
nandez-Rogue v. Smith, 539 F. Supp. 925, 935 n.25 (N.D. Ga. 1982) (stating inclination
toward view that Protocol is self-executing). See also Note, Interdiction: The United States'
Continuing Violation of International Law, 68 B.U. L. REV. 773 (1988) (contending that the
Protocol is self-executing and that the non-refoulement "obligation is a customary norm
of international law").
It should further be noted that while the Supreme Court has recognized that "[tihe
Protocol [binds] parties to comply with the substantive provisions of Articles 2 through 34
of the United Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees," it has not directly
ruled on the self-executory nature of the Protocol. INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 416
(1984). This note does not further discuss this aspect of the Protocol because although it
was raised by the plaintiffs in HCC II, the Second Circuit did not address it.
151 INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S, 421, 436-37 (1987); see also Stevic, 467 U.S. at
421 (stating that the "language of Refugee Act of 1980 conforms to Protocol"); Baker, 789
F. Supp. at 1567 (acknowledging that there has been at least partial congressional enact-
ment of Protocol).
152 Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 436-37
153 8 U.S.C. § l101(a)(42)(A) (1988).
154 Protocol, supra note 5, at 6225.
155 Convention, supra note 89, 189 U.N.T.S. at 176.
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Although the scope of this non-refoulement obligation has not
been uniformly interpreted to apply extraterritorially,156 the plain
language of this Article cannot reasonably lead to the denial of pro-
tection to Haitian refugees fleeing a brutal military regime on the
grounds that those fleeing have not yet reached the territory of the
United States.
"The clear import of treaty language controls unless 'applica-
tion of the words of the treaty according to their obvious meaning
effects a result inconsistent with the intent or expectations of its sig-
natories.' "157 Article 33 clearly prohibits the "return (refouler) of a
refugee ... in any manner whatsoever to ... territories" where he
faces persecution. Given the Convention's object and purpose "to
assure refugees the widest possible exercise of . . fundamental
rights and freedoms," this plain language cannot be read to protect
refugees once they reach a contracting state's territory, yet afford
them no protection while they are in transit.' 58
Furthermore, even if it is conceded that the meaning of the word
"refouler" is ambiguous,1 59 any uncertainty is disspelled by the prac-
tice of the contracting states.' 60 The United States has recognized
implicitly and protected explicitly the Haitian refugees' right against
non-refoulement. The Reagan Executive Order and accompanying
guidelines expressly apply only to persons interdicted on interna-
tional waters and require the "strict observance of [the United
States'] international obligations concerning those who genuinely
flee persecution in their homeland."' 6 ' Instructions forbidding the
156 See, e.g., Note, The Rights of Asylum Under United States Law, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1125,
1126-27 (1980) (stating that Article 33 extends protection only to those within a con-
tracting country's territory); Note, supra note 150, at 794 (Article 33 does extend to refu-
gees outside a contracting country's territory).
157 United States v. Stuart, 489 U.S. 353, 365-66 (1989) (quoting Sumitomo Shoji
America, Inc. v. Avagliano, 457 U.S. 176, 180 (1982)). Since intent is difficult to discern in
multilateral treaties, the clear import of the treaty language controls its purpose. Id.
158 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1363 (2d Cir. 1992) (quoting
to the Preamble to the United Nations Convention, supra note 89), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II). Such an interpretation would be anomalous
with the Refugee Act which would then be interpreted to protect refugees in the United
States and also within their home country (section 101(a)(42)(A) allows the President, in
special circumstances to specify that a person may be considered a refugee even if he has
not yet left the country of persecution), yet deny these same refugees any protection while
they are in transit, See 8 U.S.C. § 1101 (a)(42)(a) (1988).
159 Although the dissent contends that the word "refouler" is ambiguous, it is not
clear that any ambiguity does exist. Compare HCC I, 969 F.2d at 1377 (Walker, J., dissent-
ing), with id. at 1363.
160 The Supreme Court has stated that "the practice of treaty signatories counts as
evidence of the treaties' proper interpretation, since their conduct generally evinces their
understanding of the agreement they signed." Stuart, 489 U.S. at 369.
161 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, §§ 2(d), 3. In discussing the possible imple-
mentation of an interdiction program, participants in hearings before the Subcommittee
on Immigration and Refugee Policy made it clear that any such program would have to
comply with the United States' non-refoulement obligation. United States as a Country of
Mass First Asylum: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Immigration and Refugee Policy of the Senate
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return of a refugee were clear, and the INS officers involved in the
interdiction program were to be "constantly watchful for any indica-
tion (including bare claims) that a person or persons on board the
interdicted vessel may qualify as refugees under the United Nations
Protocol." 162
The United States again recognized its non-refoulement obliga-
tion in its agreement with Haiti. While the Haitian government, at
the time, agreed to allow U.S. Coast Guard Cut:ers to board Haitian
vessels and to return the passengers to Haiti, it was understood that
"under these arrangements the United States Government does not
intend to return to Haiti any Haitian migrants whom the United
States authorities determine to qualify for refugee status."' 163
These interpretations are consistent with the construction of the
United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR). l64 Ac-
cording to the UNHCR, a person becomes a refugee as soon as he
fulfills the criteria contained in the definition and "this would neces-
sarily occur prior to the time at which his refugee status is formally
determined."' 165 Moreover, the UNHCR has taken the position that
the non-refoulement obligation applies extraterritorially. 166 These
determinations of the UNHCR are not to be considered unimpor-
tant, especially in light of the fact that "in a number of countries,
including Canada and Australia, the Office of the High Commis-
sioner participates directly in procedures established for the deter-
mination of refugee status."' 167
Given the plain language of the Article and the practice of treaty
Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. (1981). Sen. Alan K. Simpson stated that "we
are as a country a signing party to the 1968 United Nation Protocol Relating to the Status
of Refugees, and therefore bound by that agreement to refrain from returning persons to
a country where they will be persecuted." Id. at 2. Echoing his sentiments, Doris M. Meis-
ner, Acting Comm'r. for the INS declared that if an interdiction program were established,
"procedures would be established to comply with our international obligations relating to
refugees and the granting of asylum." Id. at 20.
162 Reagan Exec. Order, supra note 40, § 3.
163 U.S.-Haiti Agreement, supra note 47, at 3560.
164 In 1979, the UNHCR published a handbook interpreting the United Nations Con-
vention and the Protocol. This document describes and interprets the United Nations
Convention section by section. While this handbook is not a treaty and has no binding
force as international law, the handbook has been used as guidance by some U.S. courts.
See, e.g., INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 439 n.22 ("the Handbook provides signifi-
cant guidance in construing the Protocol, to which Congress ought to conform. It has
been widely considered useful in giving content to the obligations that the Protocol estab-
lishes.") Furthermore, under Article II of the Protocol, the United States agreed to "co-
operate with the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees . . . and
shall in particular facilitate [the UNHCR's] duty of supervising the application of the provi-
sions of the present Protocol. Protocol, supra note 5, 19 U.S.T. at 6226.
165 UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR REFUGEES, HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES
AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS § 28 (1979).
166 Id.
167 B.Jackman & B. Knaza, Refugees (1980) (unpublished paper presenting a detailed
description of the Canadian system. On file with the Lawyers Committee for International
Human Rights, New York, N.Y.)
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signatories, the clear import of the treaty is established, and any reli-
ance on the negotiating history of the Convention is not only unnec-
essary, but is disallowed. Article 32 of the Protocol "requires an
interpreting body to conclude that an ordinary meaning of the text is
either obscure or unreasonable before it can look to 'supplementary
means' [and] reflects reluctance to permit the use of materials consti-
tuting the development and negotiation of an agreement (Travaux
Pr6paratoires) as a guide to interpretation of the agreement."'1 68
The dissent's reliance on the negotiating history of the Convention is
therefore not only misplaced, but the conclusion reached contra-
venes a basic tenet articulated by the Supreme Court: "treaties are
to be construed in a broad and liberal spirit[,] and when two con-
structions are possible, one restrictive of rights which may be
claimed under it, and the other favorable to them, the latter is
preferred."1 69
B. Review of Presidential Authority to Issue the Kennebunkport Order
The Second Circuit notes that "there is an undercurrent in the
government's brief to the effect that this case presents a 'political
question' which is beyond the scope ofjudicial decision making."' 170
A cause of action is nonjusticiable if it is "unsuited to judicial inquiry
or adjustment" because it presents a "political question" by involv-
ing the "relationship between the judiciary and the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government" in such a way as to implicate
the doctrine of separation of powers.' 71 However, phrasing the is-
sue to assert that the courts cannot "intrude into a delicate area of
the nation's foreign policy,"' 72 will not render the Presidential ac-
tion unreviewable.
While it is recognized that the executive branch has power to
control the foreign affairs of the nation, I r7 the fact that a controversy
affects immigration or foreign policy does not of itself render the
controversy nonjusticiable.174 There exists no "lack ofjudicially dis-
coverable and manageable standards" to apply,' 75 and the Supreme
Court has expressly allowed narrow judicial review of decisions made
168 RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 325 cmt. e (1987).
169 Haitiai- Refugee Center v. Baker, 953 F.2d 1498, 1571 (11th Cir.) (quoting
Asakura v. Seattle, 265 U.S. 332, 342 (1924)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1245 (1992).
170 Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1367 (2d Cir. 1592), cert.
granted, 61 U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II).
171 Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1565 (quoting Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 196, 210 (1962)).
172 Greenhouse, High Court Will Take Up Bush's Policy on Haitians, N.Y. TIMES, Oc'. 6,
1992, at A20.
173 United States ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537, 542 (1950).
174 Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1565.
175 Id. at 1566. See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 217 (1962). It should also be noted
that the dissent in HCC I1 implicitly agrees that this case involves a justiciable issue. See
Haitian Centers Council v. McNary, 969 F.2d 1350, 1379-80 (2d Cir. 1992), cert. granted, 61
U.S.L.W. 3082 (U.S. Oct. 5, 1992) (HCC II).
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by Congress or the President in the area of immigration and
naturalization. 1 76
Haitian Centers Council involves "a determination of whether the
current interdiction program itself (a creature of an executive order,
and thus, of law), is consistent with a federal statute.177 "The federal
courts may review a case . . . to insure that the 'executive depart-
ments abide by the legislatively mandated procedures.' "178 More-
over, while Congress allows the President to "suspend the entry of
all aliens or any class of aliens," Congress has also explicitly forbid-
den the violation of the United States' non-refoulement obligation
embodied in section 243(h)(1). The President's authority to regulate
the "entry" of aliens is thus limited by the INA's explicit adoption of
the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. "When the
President takes measures incompatible with the expressed or implied
will of Congress, his power is at its lowest ebb, for then he can rely
only upon his own constitutional power minus any constitutional
powers of Congress over the matter."' 179
V. Reaction to President Bush's Repatriation Program
Just three days after President Bush announced the creation of
his interdiction program, Congressman Conyers noted the irony that
"today, May 27, is exactly 53 years [since] the Hamburg American
Lines Cruiser, the St. Louis, arrived in the Caribbean. On board
were 903 passengers who had red "J" stamped on their passports
identifying them as Jewish refugees fleeing Hitler's Germany. With
embarassment and the only other time that has happened, the Jews
on the St. Louis could find no sanctuary in the United States."' 80
What is the difference between this incomprehensible act and the
forcible repatriation of Haitian refugees to their persecutors? An-
other Congressman noted that "when George Bush ordered that
persecuted Haitians fleeing a brutal military dictatorship be forced
back to Haiti, it was one of the most cruel, hypocritical, and cynical
acts of a heartless administration."'18' The United Nations High
Commissioner for Refugees added her voice of criticism to President
Bush's decision to turn back Haitian boat people without giving
them a chance to apply for asylum.' 8 2
176 Baker, 789 F. Supp. at 1565.
177 HCC 1H, 969 F.2d at 1367. See Acevedo v. Nassau County, 500 F.2d 1078, 1084 n.7
(2d Cir. 1974).
178 Id. (quoting Haitian Refugee Center v. Gracey, 809 F.2d 794, 838 n. 116 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Edwards, J., concurring)).
179 Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
180 138 CONG. REC. H3824 (daily ed. May 27, 1992).
181 138 CONG. REC. S12398 (daily ed. Aug. 11, 1992) (printing into the record Robert
R. Klein, Bush Is Denounced As Heartless In Haiti, STAR LEDGER, June 13, 1992).
182 138 CONG. REC. H3991 (daily ed. May 28, 1992).
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OnJune 15, 1992, the Bush Administration defended its repatri-
ation order by claiming that the Haitians are fleeing "economic con-
ditions, and that "there have been no reports of mistreatment of
returnees."1 8 3 In actuality, the Bush Administration chose to close
its eyes to the continued human rights violations being perpetrated
by a military government. On Monday, May 18, 1992, unidentified
planes dropped leaflets with Aristide's picture asking the population
to mobilize. "Those persons who were found with these leaflets in
their possession were beaten and arrested."1 8 4 The next day, five
bodies were found on the street with bullet wounds.1 8 5 In St. Marc,
a port town north of Port-au-Prince, there is talk of "Mr. 52", a po-
lice officer who whips anyone he arrests 52 times unless a $100 bribe
is paid on the spot. 186 Then, there is "Z" who tells the Haitian peo-
ple that he reigns over all and that there is no higher authority.' 8 7
The list goes on and on, and under Bush's program to "safeguard
human life," these human rights violations will only be accentuated.
Sadly, the Clinton Administration has yet to repeal the Bush Execu-
tive Order despite the new President's campaign promises to treat
Haitians more sympathetically.
Despite all the reports made available to the Bush and Carter
Administrations, the government continues to maintain that Haitians
can present their asylum claims at the American Embassy in Haiti.
One need only look at the statistics to realize that this alternative is a
sham. When the Haitians were being screened at Guantanamo Bay,
under the Reagan Interdiction Program, thirty percent were found to
have a credible claim of asylum. Under the "program" at the Ameri-
can Embassy Haiti, however, only about one percent have been ap-
proved.' 8 8 Even more compelling than these statistics is the story of
Carl Henri Richardson.189 Mr. Richardson campaigned on behalf of
President Aristide.' 90 On November 10, 1991, troops searched his
house without a warrant. 19 1 The next day, Mr. Richardson was ar-
rested and thrown in jail for thirteen days. 19 2 In June, 1992, after
months of hiding, Mr. Richardson went to the U.S. consulate to ap-
ply for refugee status.' 9 3 After waiting outside for two hours, he was
183 McKinley Statement, supra note 62.
184 138 CONG. REC. E1729 (daily ed. June 9, 1992) (statement of Hon. Lucien E.
Blackwell).
185 HAITI: A HUMAN RIGHTS NIGHTMARE, supra note 8, at 10.
186 Howard French, Hope Is Quiet in Small Haitian Town, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 19, 1992, at
3.
187 Id.
188 Greenhouse, supra note 172.
189 Anne Fuller & Andrew Levin, U.S. Haitian Refugee Policy-a Brutal 'Alternative', CHRIS-
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told that he needed more documentation to prove that he had a rea-
sonable fear of persecution.194 While travelling to get this additional
information, Mr. Richardson was beaten by Haitian soldiers for three
hours-he was beaten on the head until he lost consciousness. 95 He
was then kept in jail for a week. 196 The Bush Administration then
declared it was "very interested in speaking with" Mr. Richardson. 197
Unfortunately, the case of Mr. Richardson is not atypical. President
Bush's use of the U.S. Embassy in Haiti as an "alternative" to flight
by sea thus is nothing but a cruel hoax for the thousands of Haitian
refugees forced to continue to face their persecutors.
In the face of these human rights violations, Congress has not
only applauded the recent decision in Haitian Centers Council,'98 it has
undertaken to protect the Haitian refugees through explicit legisla-
tion. As early as February 25, 1992, the Haitian Refugee Protection
Act of 1992 was presented "to assure the protection of Haitians in
the United States or in United States custody.., or on board United
States Government vessels, . . .or elsewhere outside the United
States ... ."199 These Haitians were not to be involuntarily returned
to Haiti. On May 27, 1992, another bill was introduced in part to
"terminate the migrant interdiction agreement between the United
States and Haiti, and to direct the President to establish expanded
processing facilities for Haitians seeking refuge. ' 200 Outraged by
what it considered to be the Administration's continued violation of
international law, a bill was introduced onJune 10, 1992 to "reaffirm
the obligation of the United States to refrain from the involuntary
return of refugees outside the United States." 20' The final status of
these bills is still pending.
Conclusion
As a self-proclaimed leader in the fight against human rights vio-
lations, the United States stained its soul with its forcible repatriation
of Haitian refugees. The Second Circuit's decision in Haitian Centers
Council v. McNary, however, provides hope-hope to the Haitian ref-
ugees that they will be able to escape their persecutors. This deci-
sion, however, impacts on more than just the Haitian refugees. It
sends a message to the Executive Branch and to the international
community at large. When Congress has adopted explicitly the non-





198 138 CONG. REc. S11960 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1992).
199 H.R. REP. No. 437, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
200 H.R. 5267, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
201 H.R. 5360, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. (1992).
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Refugees, the courts should not and will not let the President cir-
cumvent the obligations this country has undertaken to uphold.
CHRISTINA CAROLE DE MATTEIS

